• 16 Nov, 2026

Bangladesh Bank: The Central Bank of Bangladesh Driving Financial Inclusion

Bangladesh Bank: The Central Bank of Bangladesh Driving Financial Inclusion

Bangladesh Bank is well-positioned for continued success in the years to come. Bangladesh Bank is the central bank of Bangladesh and a key player in the country's financial sector.

Overview

Bangladesh Bank (BB) is the central bank of Bangladesh: the country's monetary authority, the issuer of the taka and the apex regulator of its financial system. Established with effect from 16 December 1971 under the Bangladesh Bank Order, 1972, it is wholly owned by the Government of Bangladesh. The bank formulates and implements monetary policy, supervises the scheduled banks — 61 of them as of 2025 — and the non-bank financial institutions, manages the country's foreign-exchange reserves, regulates the national payment system and acts as banker to the government.

For most of its history, Bangladesh Bank worked in the shadow of the government of the day. Since August 2024 it has stood at the centre of the largest financial-sector reckoning in the country's history: a forced clean-up of banks hollowed out by years of politically connected lending, the first resolution and merger of failed banks, and a public argument about how independent a central bank in Bangladesh can really be. Its fourteenth governor, Md Mostaqur Rahman, has held office since February 2026.

History

Bangladesh Bank began as the Dhaka branch of the State Bank of Pakistan. After the Liberation War, the Bangladesh Bank Order, 1972 (President's Order No. 127 of 1972) reorganised that branch into a new central bank, with retrospective effect from 16 December 1971, Victory Day. Its first governor, A. N. M. Hamidullah, took office in January 1972, charged with building a monetary system for a war-devastated economy.

The young institution's first decade was spent administering a nationalised system: in 1972 the government nationalised the commercial banks, creating six state-owned banks. Private banking returned from the early 1980s, and the larger system that followed, of dozens of private banks licensed in successive waves, was formalised under the Bank Company Act 1991. The Bangladesh Bank Order was amended in 2003 to regularise the governor's tenure.

Two shocks define the bank's modern history. In February 2016 hackers stole $81 million from its account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York — still one of the largest cyber-heists ever suffered by a central bank (see The 2016 Reserve Heist). In August 2024, after the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in a mass uprising, Governor Abdur Rouf Talukder resigned, and the economist Ahsan H. Mansur was appointed to clean up a banking sector whose true condition had been concealed for years (see Governance and Leadership).

Mandate and Functions

The bank's functions are set out in Section 7A of the Bangladesh Bank Order, 1972, and summarised by the bank itself as follows:

  • formulating and implementing monetary and credit policy;
  • regulating and supervising banks and non-bank financial institutions, and promoting and developing domestic financial markets;
  • managing the country's international reserves;
  • issuing currency notes;
  • regulating and supervising the payment system;
  • acting as banker to the government;
  • preventing money laundering;
  • collecting and furnishing credit information, through its Credit Information Bureau;
  • implementing foreign-exchange regulation under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act; and
  • managing the deposit insurance scheme.

In practice the mandate also makes it the system's lender of last resort: banks facing temporary shortages borrow through repo operations and the standing lending facility, while non-viable banks are dealt with under the resolution framework below. It licenses and supervises scheduled banks under the Bank Company Act 1991 and finance companies under the Finance Company Act 2023.

Governance and Leadership

Bangladesh Bank is governed by a nine-member board of directors chaired by the governor, who is also the institution's chief executive. The governor is appointed by the government for a four-year term, renewable at the government's discretion; the Bangladesh Bank Order prescribes no professional criteria for the post — a gap central to debates about the bank's independence.

Ahsan H. Mansur, a former IMF economist, became the thirteenth governor on 14 August 2024, appointed by the interim government, and drove the post-2024 clean-up: tight money, forensic audits, reconstituted boards and a new resolution law. On 25 February 2026, days after a BNP-led government took office following the February 2026 general election, the finance ministry cancelled the remainder of his term — originally running to August 2028 — "in public interest" and appointed Md Mostaqur Rahman in his place. Mansur said he had not resigned and had learned of the change from television news (see Challenges and Criticism).

Mostaqur Rahman, the fourteenth governor, is a cost and management accountant and garment entrepreneur — managing director of Hera Sweaters Ltd — and the first person from a purely business background to head the central bank. Appointed for a four-year term from 25 February 2026, he has chaired the Monetary Policy Committee through its 2026 decisions, including the first policy-rate cut in six years in July 2026. He is supported by four deputy governors; as of late 2026 they are Md Habibur Rahman, Md Kabir Ahmed, and two career central bankers promoted in July 2026, Md Sarwar Hossain and Md Anis Ur Rahman.

Organisation and Offices

The head office stands in Motijheel, Dhaka. The bank has ten offices in all — Motijheel and Sadarghat in Dhaka, and one each in Chittagong, Khulna, Bogra, Rajshahi, Sylhet, Barisal, Rangpur and Mymensingh. A January 2026 restructuring aligned supervision into seventeen departments — twelve bank supervision departments, each responsible for a portfolio of banks, and five specialised departments — to support the new risk-based supervision framework.

Monetary Policy

Monetary policy is set by the bank's Monetary Policy Committee through the policy (repo) rate, inside an interest-rate corridor bounded by the standing lending facility (SLF) above it and the standing deposit facility (SDF) below. The stance is published in a Monetary Policy Statement, half-yearly until a switch to quarterly publication in 2026.

The recent cycle has been dramatic. The policy rate stood at 4.75 percent from July 2020 until May 2022, a pandemic-era low. As inflation surged, the bank raised it in steps to a record 10 percent in October 2024 — and held it there for twenty-one months, through June 2026. Disinflation was slow: point-to-point inflation eased from 10.89 percent in December 2024 to 8.49 percent in December 2025, but the twelve-month average was still 8.68 percent in June 2026, above official targets.

The first easing came on 30 July 2026, when the committee cut the policy rate by 50 basis points to 9.5 percent, effective 2 August — the first cut in six years — and lowered the SLF to 11 percent, leaving the SDF at 7.5 percent. It held the rate at 9.5 percent in September 2026, judging inflation still too high for faster easing. A crawling peg was introduced in May 2024, and on 14 May 2025 the bank moved to a market-based exchange rate, a key condition of Bangladesh's $4.7 billion IMF programme; the taka, near Tk 86 to the dollar in early 2022, has since traded around Tk 120–123.

Foreign Exchange Reserves

Bangladesh's reserves trace the country's recent economic arc. Swollen by pandemic-era remittances, gross reserves peaked at $48.06 billion in August 2021. They then fell for almost three years as import bills surged, export and remittance earnings faltered, and the central bank sold dollars to defend the taka — $13.6 billion in the 2022–23 fiscal year alone.

Since mid-2023 the bank has published a second, stricter figure under the IMF's BPM6 methodology, which excludes assets not readily available for intervention, such as Export Development Fund loans made from the reserves. The BPM6 figure is consistently several billion dollars below the gross headline: it stood at $24.75 billion when the series began in June 2023, and it bottomed at $20.48 billion in July 2024 and $19.86 billion in September 2024, when gross reserves were $24.86 billion.

The rebuilding since late 2024 has been steep, powered by record remittances — $30.05 billion in the 2024–25 fiscal year, the first time inflows passed $30 billion — restrained imports, and the central bank switching from selling dollars to buying them. Gross reserves reached $37.58 billion by the end of June 2026 ($32.93 billion on the BPM6 basis) and stood at about $36.4 billion gross and $31.6 billion BPM6 in mid-October 2026 — roughly five and a half months of import cover, comfortably above the IMF's three-month benchmark, though still well short of the 2021 peak.

Banking Regulation and the 2024–26 Clean-up

For years, supervision failed to keep pace with the system's growth. The boards of several large banks were captured by business groups close to the former government, credit flowed on political connection rather than creditworthiness, and weak loans were kept off the books through lenient rescheduling and classification. The reckoning began in August 2024, when Bangladesh Bank dissolved and reconstituted the boards of fourteen banks — among them Islami Bank Bangladesh, IFIC Bank and National Bank — installing independent directors and ordering forensic audits. Honest classification then forced the hidden losses into the open: officially recognised defaulted loans rose from Tk 284,977 crore in September 2024 to Tk 644,515 crore in September 2025, an NPL ratio of 35.73 percent.

The interim government gave the bank new legal weapons. The Bank Resolution Ordinance, gazetted on 9 May 2025, empowered it to declare a bank non-viable, dissolve its board, appoint administrators, create bridge banks, transfer its business or petition for its liquidation; parliament converted the ordinance into the Bank Resolution Act in April 2026; a September 2026 amendment removed a clause that could have let former shareholders buy back a resolved bank. A companion Deposit Protection Ordinance in November 2025 doubled insured deposits to Tk 2 lakh per depositor.

The framework's first great test came on 5 November 2025, when five Shariah-based banks — First Security Islami, Social Islami, Global Islami, Union and EXIM — whose forensic audits showed default rates between 48 and 98 percent, were declared non-viable and placed under administrators. On 1 December 2025 they were merged into a new state-owned lender, Sammilito Islami Bank, capitalised with Tk 35,000 crore — Tk 20,000 crore from the government and Tk 15,000 crore from institutional depositors — making it the country's largest bank by capital and its sixty-second scheduled bank. Their shareholders, holding shares with deeply negative net asset values, received no compensation. Nine non-bank financial institutions were earmarked for liquidation, supervision of all banks moved to a risk-based framework in January 2026, and the bank has announced plans for a dedicated resolution fund of Tk 30,000–40,000 crore.

Not every case is settled. Padma Bank, the renamed and repeatedly rescued former Farmers Bank, saw a planned merger into EXIM Bank collapse after the 2024 changeover. In October 2026 the central bank stated emphatically that no decision had been taken to close it and that it was working to revive the bank; in early November 2026, however, it was reported to have taken a preliminary decision to liquidate Padma, subject to approval by its own board — which would be the first bank liquidation in Bangladesh's history.

Currency and Payment Systems

Bangladesh Bank issues the banknotes of the taka, which circulate in denominations from Tk 2 to Tk 1,000 alongside coins. The notes are printed on cotton paper with security features including a Royal Bengal Tiger watermark, security threads and microprinting. In June 2025 the bank began issuing a new series themed "Historic and Archaeological Structures of Bangladesh" — the first designs not to carry the portrait of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The purple Tk 1,000 note depicts the National Martyrs' Memorial and the Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban; the Tk 50 shows Ahsan Manzil and Zainul Abedin's painting Sangram; the Tk 20 the Kantajew Temple and the Paharpur monastery. Older notes remain in circulation.

The bank also operates the plumbing of the payment system. Its Automated Clearing House handles cheque processing (modernised in 2010) and BEFTN electronic transfers (from February 2011); the National Payment Switch (2012) routes card and ATM transactions between banks; BD-RTGS (October 2015) settles transfers of Tk 1 lakh and above in real time. Two consumer-facing schemes followed: Bangla QR, an interoperable QR payment standard launched in January 2023 and accepted by some 963,000 merchants by the end of 2025, and TakaPay, the national debit card launched in November 2023 to cut dependence on international card networks, which seventeen banks were issuing by 2025. Mobile financial services also operate under the bank's regulation.

The 2016 Reserve Heist

On the night of 4–5 February 2016, attackers who had compromised Bangladesh Bank's SWIFT messaging system sent thirty-five fraudulent payment instructions to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, seeking to move about $951 million from the central bank's account there. The New York Fed blocked thirty of the transfers, worth about $850 million; five went through, worth $101 million. A $20 million transfer to Sri Lanka was recovered after a routing bank queried a misspelt beneficiary name — "fundation" for "foundation". The remaining $81 million reached four accounts at the Jupiter Street branch of the Philippines' Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and was laundered through a remittance company into Manila casinos, which at the time sat largely outside anti-money-laundering law.

Investigators linked the attack to North Korea's Lazarus Group, and US prosecutors later charged a North Korean programmer, Park Jin Hyok, in connection with it. The Philippine central bank fined RCBC a record one billion pesos, and its branch manager Maia Santos Deguito was convicted of money laundering in 2019. In Dhaka, Governor Atiur Rahman resigned on 15 March 2016, accepting moral responsibility, and two deputy governors were removed.

Recovery has been slow. The Sri Lankan tranche was returned in full, and about $15 million of the Philippine money was recovered in 2016, leaving roughly $66 million outstanding for nearly a decade while Bangladesh Bank's 2019 lawsuit against RCBC and others ground through courts in New York and the Philippines. In September 2025 a Dhaka court ordered the seizure of the full $81 million from RCBC on a petition by the Criminal Investigation Department; CID officials clarified that the funds had not yet been physically seized and that repatriation depended on completing the legal process in the Philippines.

Challenges and Criticism

The clean-up has exposed how deep the earlier failures ran, and Bangladesh Bank's own conduct is part of the story. Under the previous government the bank tolerated evergreening and generous rescheduling — notably a 2019 scheme allowing defaulters to regularise loans with a down payment of just 2 percent — and published NPL figures that bore little relation to reality. Once honest classification was enforced, the ratio reached 35.73 percent in September 2025, reported as the highest in the world; it was still 32.78 percent in June 2026, and at the state-owned banks defaulted loans stood at 44.6 percent of all lending in June 2025. Reserve management draws similar criticism: for years the bank sold reserves to defend an overvalued taka and lent from them through vehicles such as the Export Development Fund, while resisting the stricter IMF accounting it now publishes.

Above all, the bank's independence remains contested. The governor serves in practice at the government's pleasure: Mansur's mid-term removal in February 2026 — executed without notice, and learned of from television while he was still in office — was condemned by economists and former officials as a blow to central-bank credibility, and the appointment of a governor from business, without a central-banking background, intensified the debate. Mansur had been pressing for amendments to the Bangladesh Bank Order and the Bank Company Act to entrench the bank's autonomy and tighten bank-board governance; as of late 2026 those reforms remained unresolved, leaving the institution's independence dependent on the government of the day.

Outlook and Conclusion

The immediate agenda is a difficult balancing act. Inflation — which the bank itself projects at about 8.9 percent in December 2026 — remains far above target even as a cautious easing cycle begins; a third of the banking system's loans are classified as non-performing; and the resolution pipeline, from consolidating Sammilito Islami Bank to liquidating failed finance companies and deciding the fate of Padma Bank, will test the new legal framework for years. Set against that, reserves have been rebuilt to their strongest level since 2022, remittances are at record highs, and supervision has been reorganised on risk-based lines.

The institution will be judged on two things: whether it can bring the bad-loan mountain down without a depositor panic or a credit crunch, and whether the events of February 2026 prove an exception or a precedent. A central bank that can be decapitated overnight, its critics argue, cannot anchor expectations — the very commodity monetary policy trades in. Bangladesh Bank now has the legal tools, and for the moment the reserves, to stabilise the system; whether it will be allowed the independence to use them is the open question of its next half-century.